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This paper analyzes a model of two-way movement of physical capital, and
examines the e¤ects of direct investment liberalization on resource alloca-
tion, income distribution, and commodity trade. If either country or both
countries liberalizes investment under exogenously given commodity prices,
some factor owners in a country will gain but some others will lose. If capital
movement a¤ects commodity prices, there are cases in which all factor own-
ers in a country are better o¤ after multilateral investment liberalization. In
these cases, it will be much easier for the home country to sign an agreement
liberalizing investment ‡ows.
This paper was presented at the workshop on “WTO and World Trade,”
Seattle, December 4, 1999 (http://faculty.washington.edu/karyiu/)a n da t
the workshop on WTO at University of California, Santa Cruz, May 12,
2000. Thanks are due to Theo Eicher and the participants of the two
workshops for comments. Copies of this paper can be obtained online at
http://faculty.washington.edu/karyiu/.
c ° Kar-yiu Wong.1I n t r o d u c t i o n
Previous multilateral trade talks organized by the General Agreement on
Tari¤s and Trade (GATT) focused nearly exclusively on trade liberalization
and reduction of trade restrictions. Very little e¤orts had been made on liber-
alizing direct investment and the movement of capital (physical or …nancial)
among countries. Things changed toward the end of the Uruguay round,
when countries turned their attention to direct investment across country
borders. At the end of the round, countries signed an agreement restrict-
ing trade related investment measures (TRIMs). With the conclusion of the
GATT and the establishment of the World Trade Organization (WTO), the
agreement on TRIMs prohibits WTO member countries from applying “any
TRIM that is inconsistent with the provisions of Article III (obligation of
national treatment) or Article XI (no quantitative restrictions) of GATT
1994.”
Despite these e¤orts, the agreement on TRIMs is incomplete and ‡awed.
First, it prohibits certain investment measures only in the context of the
GATT articles. Second, there are many articles of GATT that can be used
as loopholes for countries to hide or disguise many types of TRIMs.1 Third,
Article V of the agreement gives countries substantial transition period be-
fore the agreement is fully implemented: two years for developed countries,
…ve years for developing countries and seven years for least developed coun-
tries.2 In fact, many developing countries are currently applying to extend
the transitional period.3
Nevertheless, it is clear that countries are paying increasing attention to
issues related to cross-country investment. For example, the Organization for
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) member countries began
in 1995 multilateral negotiations on issues related to investment, aiming at
concluding a comprehensive multilateral agreement on investment (MAI).
1For example, Article IV of the agreement permits developing countries to deviate
from the agreement when experiencing balance-of-payment di¢culties, in accordance with
Article XVIII of the GATT.
2See Edwards and Lester (1997) and Daly (1988) for more details.
3Many countries are applying to the WTO for extension of the transitional period
before implementing the full agreement on TRIMs agreement. See the following web site
for links — http://faculty.washington.edu/karyiu/WTO/links.htm.
1With the increasing attention to investment issues and with the increasing
importance of investment ‡ows internationally, people are urging the WTO to
reach a new agreement on TRIMs.4 Thus, after more than forty years’ e¤orts
and achievement on trade liberalization, time has come to consider doing
something about trade related investment measures. There is a belief that
new multilateral agreements on TRIMs can be reached in the near future.
The objective of this paper is to examine the e¤ects of multilateral in-
vestment liberalization on resource allocation, commodity trade, and income
distribution. The e¤ects on income distribution are especially important be-
cause whether a country has an incentive to sign an agreement on TRIMs
depends on how much support it can get domestically, which in turn depends
on how various individuals in the economy may be a¤ected by such an agree-
ment. Ideally, a country will have no hesitation to sign such an agreement
if the agreement Pareto improves the economy. While Pareto dominating
policies are rare, it is the purpose of this paper to search for a multilateral
investment liberalizing policy that making all individuals in a country better
o¤.
Analyzing multilateral investment liberalizing is uncommon in the litera-
ture. Most papers focus on analyzing the restrictions imposed by one single
country on investment from abroad.5 For the purpose of this paper, we need
a model that can be used to analyze the investment liberalization policies of
two countries at the same time. For the same reason, the model should allow
movement of capital in both directions, so that the two countries under con-
sideration play host to investment from the other country. Such a two-way
‡ow of capital has been analyzed in the literature, but none of the available
models has been used to address the issues we are looking at in the present
paper.
In addition to examining the impacts on income distribution, the model
is used to investigate how multilateral investment liberalization may a¤ect
commodity trade. In the present model, we consider a simple case in which
free trade in goods is allowed, while the investment restrictions imposed by
the countries are being lessened. Because changes in the investment policies
of the countries may a¤ect the countries’ income and production, the vol-
umes of trade may be a¤ected. Whether capital movement may diminish or
4See, for example, Edwards and Lester (1997) and Graham (1996).
5For a recent survey on e¤ects of investment liberalization, mainly by one single country,
see Wong (1995, Chapters 11 and 13).
2augment commodity trade is what we want to …nd out.
We discover that with no monopoly power in trade, both countries can
expect to …nd both gainers and losers in the economy as investment is liber-
alized by either one or both countries, although who gain or who lose is not
certain, depending on, among other things, how capital movements a¤ect
factor prices in the two countries. If the countries have certain monopoly
power in trade so that commodity prices are a¤ected by capital movement,
there may exist some investment liberalization policies that bene…t everyone
in a country.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the
model. In particular, we use sector-speci…c capital to introduce two-way
‡ows of capital. Section 3 examines free trade in goods and movement of
capital. Section 4 investigates the e¤ects of unilateral and multilateral in-
vestment liberalization and examines how it may a¤ect resource allocation
and income distribution. The case considered in Sections 2 to 4 is one in
which both countries have no monopoly power in trade. Section 5 relaxes
the latter assumption and investigates how investment liberalization may
a¤ect world prices of commodities, resource allocation, and income distri-
bution. In particular, it will …nd out whether investment liberalization can
bene…t everyone in the home country. The last section concludes.
2 The Model: Sector-Speci…c Capital
For the purpose of this paper, we need a model that allows two-way move-
ments of capital. We choose the speci…c-capital model, sometimes called
the Ricardo-Viner model, with two types of capital, each of which is spe-
ci…c to a sector.6 This model has been used in many papers and are well
known to trade theorists.7 As Batra and Ramachandran (1980) argue, sector
speci…city of capital is a reasonable assumption for analyzing international
6There are other models of cross-hauling of direct investment. For example, Chan and
Wong (1998) considers a model in which intraindustry trade and intraindustry investment
could exist between two countries.
7See Jones (1971) and Wong (1995, Chapter 2) for a discussion of speci…c-factor models
and the references for some of the work using speci…c-factor models. These models have
been used to analyze various issues related to international factor mobility; for example,
Batra and Ramachandran (1980), Caves (1982), Brecher and Feentra (1983), Jones, Neary
and Ruane (1983), and Srinivasan (1983). However, none of these papers have addressed
the issues currently considered in this paper.
3capital movement because international investment involves more than trans-
fer of capital. Technological knowledge, managerial know-how, and market-
ing techniques are embodied in international investment and speci…c to the
sector. Caves (1982) also makes a similar point: international investment
involves the transfer of a bundle of sector-speci…c assets. This approach
has also been used in other papers such as Brecher and Findlay (1983) and
Srinivasan (1983) to investigate various issues about international capital
movement.
This paper considers two economies called home and foreign. In each
of these two economies, there are two competitive sectors labeled 1 and 2,
and two types of capital labeled K-capital and B-capital, which are speci…c
to sectors 1 and 2, respectively. Labor is perfectly mobile between the two
sectors; thus the wage rates in the two sectors are equalized in equilibrium.
Prices are perfectly ‡exible, guaranteeing full employment of factors. In
terms of two-way capital ‡ows, we assume that under the conditions speci…ed
in this paper, home is a source country for K-capital and a host country for
B-capital. Suppose that the home country imposes an income tax of speci…c
rate 1 >¿¸ 0 on foreign B-capital working in the economy, while the foreign
country imposes an income tax of speci…c rate 1 >t ¤ ¸ 0 on the home K-
capital working in its economy.8 Throughout the present paper, ¿ and t¤ are
treated as policy parameters.
This section derives the properties of the home economy. Denote the two
sectoral production functions by:
Q1 = F(K;L1) (1a)
Q2 = G(B;L2); (1b)
where Qi is the output of sector i, Li is the labor input in sector i; i =1 ;
2, and K and B are the inputs of the two types of capital. Each production
function is concave, strictly increasing, at least twice di¤erentiable, and lin-
early homogeneous. More speci…cally, the production functions are assumed
to satisfy
Fj;G j > 0; Fjj;G jj < 0;F KL;G BL > 0; and
FLLFKK ¡ F
2
KL = GLLGBB ¡ G
2
BL =0 ; (2)
8For the issues analyzed in the present model, we consider only the cases of income
taxes, not subsidies.
4where j = K; B; L; and subscripts of the production functions denote partial
derivatives:
The home economy is endowed with given amounts of the factors, ¹ L, ¹ K;
and ¹ B: Assume that an amount k of domestic K-capital ‡ows out of sector
1 (to the foreign economy) and that an amount b¤ of foreign B-capital ‡ows
into sector 2. Full employment of the factors is described by:
L1 + L2 = ¹ L (3a)
K = ¹ K ¡ k (3b)
B = ¹ B + b
¤: (3c)
Choosing good 2 as the numeraire, de…ne p a st h ed o m e s t i cr e l a t i v ep r i c e
of good 1. Denote the domestic wage rate by w,r e n t a lr a t eo ft h eK - t y p e
capital by r; and the rental rate of the B-type capital by °:Cost minimization
by the …rms implies that the factor prices are given by
w = pFL( ¹ K ¡ k;L1) (4a)
r = pFK( ¹ K ¡ k;L1) (4b)
° = GB( ¹ B + b
¤; ¹ L ¡ L1): (4c)
Note that condition (4a) refers to sector 1, but perfect mobility of labor
equalizes the wage rate in both sectors; i.e.,
pFL( ¹ K ¡ k;L1)=GL( ¹ B + b
¤; ¹ L ¡ L1): (5)
Condition (5) can be used to solve for the equilibrium of labor employment
in sector 1, L1; in terms of p; k; and b¤; i.e., L1 = L1(p;k;b¤): Di¤erenti-
ate condition (5) and rearrange terms to yield the following e¤ects on the


















where ©=pFLL + GLL < 0: It is well known that with three factors and
two sectors, even if commodity prices are …xed, factor prices depend on the
5amounts of factors available in the economy. With factor endowments given,
factor prices can be expressed as reduced functions of the relative commodity
price and the movements of the two types of capital. Di¤erentiate both sides
of (4a) to (4c) and rearrange terms, making use of L1 = L1(k;b¤;p); to give





























































The derivatives in conditions (7a) to (7i) are intuitive. For example, an in-
crease in k; meaning more out‡ow of home K-capital, will lower the marginal
product of labor in that sector, driving some labor to sector 2, making the
wage rate lower and the marginal product of B-capital higher than before. At
the same time the marginal product of K-capital is higher with less K-capital
in sector 1. It is interesting to note further that the movement of the two
types of capital have opposite e¤ects on the factor prices. Conditions (7h)
and (7f) imply that rb¤ = ¡°k:










6where ½ is a negative number.
Proof. The proof is given in two steps. First, using the derivatives of factor


























Conditions (9) and (10) give the …rst two equalities in (8). The last equality
in (8) comes from conditions (7d) to (7i).
Lemma 1 implies that given commodity prices and for all factor prices,
the marginal e¤ect of K-capital movement on each of them is equal to a
nagative constant multiplied by the marginal e¤ect of B-capital movement
on the same factor price. It further implies that movements of the two types
of capital have opposite e¤ects on each of the factor prices. Note that the
results stated in the lemma requires constant commodity prices.
The above analysis can be extended to the foreign country. With the
assumed movemet of the two types of capital, the foreign rental rates of
capital can also be expressed as functions of its domestic price ratio and
the capital ‡ows: r¤ = r¤(p¤;k;b ¤) and °¤ = °¤(p¤;k;b ¤); where an asterisk
is used to denote a foreign variable. The same technique can be used to
show, for example, r¤
p¤ > 0;r ¤
k < 0;r ¤
b¤ > 0;° ¤
p¤ < 0;° ¤
k < 0; and °¤
b¤ > 0:
Furthermore, a condition analogous to (8) holds.
In the presence of capital mobility, denote the GDP function of the econ-
omy by g(p; ¹ K ¡k; ¹ B +b¤); which is di¤erentiable, convex in p,a n dc o n c a v e
in (K;B): Furthermore, the derivatives of the function are equal to9
gp = Q1
gK = ¡gk = r
gB = gb¤ = °:
9For the properties of the GDP function, see Wong (1995).
7Using the derivatives of the GDP function, it is easy to con…rm an earlier
r e s u l tg i v e ni n( 7 h )a n d( 7 f ) :
¡°k = °K =
@2g
@K@B
= rB = rb¤:
The e¤ects of capital movement on the output of good 1 are:
@Q1
@k







@b¤ < 0: (11b)
The national income of the home country, which is a better measure of the
welfare of the economy, is equal to
Y (p;k;b
¤;¿;t
¤)=g(p; ¹ K ¡ k; ¹ B + b
¤)+( 1¡ t
¤)r
¤k ¡ (1 ¡ ¿)°b
¤: (12)
The derivatives of the national income function are
Yp = Q1 +( 1¡ t
¤)r
¤
pk ¡ (1 ¡ ¿)°pb
¤ > 0
Yk =( 1 ¡ t
¤)r
¤
kk ¡ (1 ¡ ¿)°kb
¤ < 0
Yb¤ = ¿°+( 1¡ t
¤)r
¤






where the signs are based on the assumed directions of movements of capital
and conditions (11). Note that an increase in p improves the national income
of the economy. This is partly due to the production e¤ect, and partly due
to the income e¤ect: an increase in p raises the income of home K-capital
working abroad but lowers the payment to foreign capital working in the
economy.
Denote the consumption demand for good 1 by C1(p;Y ): Let m ´ @C1=@Y;
where mp is the marginal propensity to consume good 1. Assuming that both





¤) ¡ C1(p;Y (p;k;b
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@b¤ ¡ mYb¤ < 0 (13c)
E¿ = ¡mY¿ < 0 (13d)
Et¤ = ¡mYt¤ > 0: (13e)
In general, the signs of Ep and Ek are ambiguous. At low export levels and
capital movements, generally the o¤er curve of the economy is positively
sloped, so that Ep > 0: If the levels of movements of both types of capital
are low, Yk is small and Ek < 0:
3 Free Trade with Cross-hauling Investment
We now say something more about the world markets. Free trade exists
between the economies, while both governments impose non-prohibitive in-
come taxes on investment from the other country. The asymmetry between
the degrees of restrictions on commodity trade and capital ‡ows is to capture
the fact that previous trade talks have achieved liberalization of commodity
trade but has done little in terms of direct investment. We assume that home
exports good 1.10
In this and the next sections, we consider the case in which capital move-
ments and income taxes do not a¤ect the prevailing commodity prices faced
by both countries; this assumption will be relaxed later. Thus for the time
b e i n gw ec a nd e n o t et h er e l a t i v ep r i c eo fg o o d1b y¹ p:
Exogeneity of p c a nb ej u s t i … e da sf o l l o w s . B o t hc o u n t r i e sa r es m a l l ,
trading with the rest of world and facing given commodity prices. Capital
‡ows between the countries could a¤ect factor prices because capital owners
have to pay costs for …nancing such capital movement. These costs may exist
10This means that home exports good 1 while the capital speci…c to that sector ‡ows
out of the economy. This seems to be consistent with what is commonly observed where
a sector with comparative advantage usually sends out capital.
9in the form of risk premium as the risks associated with more movement of
K-capital go up.
In the presence of the income tax rates imposed by the two governments,
the equilibrium of international capital movement is described by the follow-
ing two conditions:
r(¹ p;k;b








For simplicity the dependence of the factor price functions on factor endow-
ments is not shown. For the present analysis, it is more convenient to de…ne
the following two functions:
Á(k;b
¤;t
¤;¹ p) ´ (1 ¡ t
¤)r
¤(¹ p;k;b
¤) ¡ r(¹ p;k;b
¤) (15a)
µ(k;b




These two functions represent the gaps between the after-tax incomes for
capitalists in the two countries. For example, if Á(k;b¤;t ¤;¹ p) > 0; then the
after-tax income of K-capital in the foreign country is higher than that in the
home country. Using these two functions, the equilibrium conditions (14a)





¤;¿;¹ p)=0 : (16b)
Di¤erentiating both sides of equation (15a) and rearranging the terms, we
get
Ák =( 1 ¡ t
¤)r
¤
k ¡ rk < 0 (17a)
Áb¤ =( 1 ¡ t
¤)r
¤
b¤ ¡ rb¤ > 0 (17b)
Át¤ = ¡r
¤ < 0 (17c)
Áp =( 1 ¡ t
¤)r
¤
p ¡ rp: (17d)
Note that Áp may be positive or negative, depending on how a change in p
a¤ects the rental rates of K-capital in the two countries.
Making use of the partial derivatives given in (17a) to (17c), and when
given t¤ and p; the equilibrium condition (16a) can be illustrated by schedule












10Equation (18) means that schedule ÁÁ is positively sloped. The reason is
that by Lemma 1, an increase in k will raise r; the rental rate of K-capital,
w h i l ea ni n c r e a s ei nb¤ will lower r: Therefore, to restore equilibrium in terms
of movement of the type-K capital, an increase in k requires a rise in b¤:
We now turn to function µ: Di¤erentiating both sides of equation (15b)
and rearranging the terms, we get
µk =( 1 ¡ ¿)°k ¡ °
¤
k > 0 (19a)
µb¤ =( 1 ¡ ¿)°b¤ ¡ °
¤
b¤ < 0 (19b)
µ¿ = ¡°<0 (19c)
µp =( 1 ¡ ¿)°p ¡ °
¤
p: (19d)
With given p and ¿; function µ is illustrated by curve µµ in Figure 1. Its



















De…ne D ´ Ákµb¤ ¡ Áb¤µk as the determinant of A: In Figure 1, point E is
a point of intersection between schedules ÁÁ and µµ; and thus represents an
equilibrium with movement of both types of capital under free trade. To
allow the comparative static analysis introduced below, we assume that such
an equilibrium is unique.
To …nd constraints on the slopes of the two schedules, we analyze the sta-
bility of an equilibrium described by an intersection between the two sched-
ules. Assume that the two types of capital move according to the following
equations:
_ k = Á(k;b
¤;t
¤;¹ p) (21a)
_ b = µ(k;b
¤;¿;¹ p); (21b)
where a dot above a variable represents the time derivative of the variable.
These two conditions mean that capital is attracted from a place where its
after-tax income is lower to a place where its after-tax income is higher.
11Lemma 2 Given the adjustment conditions (21a) and (21b), an equilib-
rium as described by (16a) and (16b) is stable if A is negative de…nite.
The stability condition as described by Lemma 2 is a standard one. Its
proof is omitted. The lemma implies that Ák < 0;µ b¤ < 0; and D>0: The








or SÁ >S µ: In other words, in Figure 1, schedule ÁÁ is steeper than schedule
µµ at the equilibrium point. This is the case shown.
4 Investment Liberalization
Refer back to the equilibrium as described by the system of equations (16a)






















4.1 Unilateral Investment Liberalization
To determine the e¤ects of investment liberalization on income distribution,
let us consider …rst the case of unilateral investment liberalization: home
slightly reduces its restriction on the in‡ow of foreign B-capital while the
foreign investment policy is unchanged, i.e., there is a small drop in the
value of ¿ while t¤ is …xed. The impacts on the movement of the two types






















12Equations (24a) and (24b) suggest that a more liberal investment policy by
the home government on the in‡ow of B-capital encourages not only the
in‡ow of foreign B-capital but also the out‡ow of domestic K-capital. The
intuition behind this result is simple. Liberalizing the in‡ow of foreign B-
capital directly encourages the in‡ow of that capital, but that will tend to
draw labor from the domestic K-sector. This lowers the marginal product
of K-capital in that sector. However, just the opposite occurs in the foreign
country: a movement of foreign labor from the B-sector to the K-sector,
raising the marginal product of K-capital. Thus more domestic K-capital is
encouraged to ‡ow from home to foreign.
Proposition 1 As m a l ld e c r e a s ei n¿ encourages more movement of both
types of capital.
The above result can be illustrated in Figure 2. From its de…nition as
given by equation (15a), function Á is independent of ¿: On the other hand,
function µ as given by equation (15b) means that a decrease in ¿ shifts sched-
ule ÁÁ in Figure 2 upward. In the diagram, schedules ÁÁ and µµ correspond
to the initial value of ¿; with the equilibrium point at E. Liberalization of
in‡ow of foreign B-capital shifts schedule µµ upward to µ
0µ
0, which intersects
unchanged schedule ÁÁ at point E0. The diagram con…rms that equilibrium
values of k and b¤ increase.
How may this policy a¤ect factor prices? This question can be answered




























The e¤ects of unilateral investment liberalization on factor prices can be
evaluated by substituting the values of the derivatives given earlier into the
right-hand sides of conditions (25a) to (25c). Before we do that, we can …rst
look at the right-hand sides of these conditions, and note that, based on
earlier analysis, the two terms on the right-hand side always have di¤erent
signs. For example, in equation (25a), while the derivatives of k and b¤ with
respect to ¿ is negative, rk > 0 and rb¤ < 0: Therefore the signs of the e¤ects
13on a change in ¿ on factor prices are in general ambiguous. We can, however,
get the results stated in the following two propositions:
Proposition 2 As m a l lr e d u c t i o ni n¿ either increases the rental rates of
both types of capital and decreases the wage rate, or decreases the two rental
rates and increases the wage rate.
Proof. This proposition can be proved by substituting condition (8) into




















Since °b¤ and rb¤ are both negative, (26) implies that as ¿ is changed, ° and
r w i l lm o v ei nt h es a m ed i r e c t i o n .




















Because wb¤ > 0 and rb¤ < 0; (27) implies that w and r are a¤ected in
opposite ways by a change in ¿:
This proposition implies that a unilateral investment liberalization will
bene…t some factor owners and will hurt some others. The next question







To interpret condition (A), rearrange the terms, noting that rb¤ < 0 and
r¤










Note that both sides of the inequality in (A0) are positive. Condition (A)
or (A0) means that home rental rate of K-capital is relatively more respon-
sive to K-capital movement, or that foreign rental rate of K-capital is more
responsive to B-capital movement.
14Given Lemma 1, and if this lemma also holds for the foreign economy,










Proposition 3 A small unilateral investment liberalization will improve the
rental rates of both types of capital and will lower the wage rate if and only
if condition (A) is satis…ed.
Proof. We …rst look at the e¤ects on the rental rate of K-capital. Substitute

















which is negative if and only if condition (A) holds. The rest of the proof
follows Proposition 2.
Proposition 3 implies that with the unilateral investment liberalization
there are some factor owners who will bene…t and some other factor owners
who will lose.
We now examine how unilateral investment liberalization may a¤ect com-

















On the right-hand side of equation (28), the …rst two terms are the indirect
e¤ects of the policy through capital movement and the third term is the
direct e¤ect, which is negative. The …rst indirect e¤ect has an ambiguous
sign while the second one is positive. So the e¤ect of investment liberalization
on commodity trade is ambiguous. In the special cases in which the levels
of movements of both types of capital are su¢ciently small, then, as shown
earlier, Ek < 0 and E¿ is small, implying that dE/d¿ in (28) is positive. In
other words, in these cases a drop in ¿ will also decrease home’s export of
good 1.
15Proposition 4 As m a l ld e c r e a s ei n¿ lowers the home country’s export of
good 1 if the initial in‡ow of foreign B-capital is su¢ciently small.
We now examine the quantitative relationship between commodity trade
and capital movement.11 Mundell (1957) analyzes how a change in the tari¤
imposed by one country may a¤ect the level of factor movement, which in
turn a¤ects the volume of trade. In this paper, we examine the e¤ects of a
change in the income tax imposed by a country. By Proposition 1, a small
decrease in ¿ encourages the movements of both types of capital.12 This
proposition and Proposition 4 can be combined to give the following:
Proposition 5 If the initial B-capital movement is small, movement of both
types of capital diminishes commodity trade.
Using the terminology in Wong (1986), we say that capital movement
diminishes commodity trade. Because we have not analyzed how commodity
trade may a¤ect capital movement, it is not clear whether they are substi-
tutes.13
4.2 A Graphical Interpretation
We now introduce a simple graphical apparatus to interpret the e¤ects of
the investment liberalization policy on income distribution. This apparatus
is convenient and will be used again later in this paper.
Using equations (7d) to (7i), the three domestic factor prices can be
expressed as functions of the movement of the two types of capital. In Figure
3, we can show contours showing combinations of k and b¤ that lead to the
same value of a factor price. For example, let us consider …rst contours for
the rental rate of K-capital, r: In Figure 2, one of these contours is shown
11Wong (1986) distinguishes between two types of the relationship between commod-
ity trade and factor movement: price equalization and quantitative relationship, with the
former focusing on whether one or both of them can lead to the world’s integrated equilib-
rium, and the latter on how a change in the level of one may lead to a change in the level
of the other. In the present paper, we look only at the quantitative relationship between
them.
12Markusen (1983) analyzes the e¤ects of capital movement on commodity trade in
several models. In these models, the change in capital movement is given exogenously.
13Wong (1986) de…nes substitutability between commodity trade and factor movement
if one of them diminishes the other and vice versa.
16and labeled ff: This contour passes point E, the initial equilibrium point,
and represents di¤erent values of k and b¤ that will yield the value of r at













where the signs of rk and rb¤ come from conditions (7e) and (7h). Thus,
contour ff is positively sloped. Furthermore, points on the left- (right-)hand
side of the schedule represent lower (higher) values of r:
The same analysis can be applied to the other two factor prices, ° and
























where the derivatives are given by (7f), (7i), (7d), and (7g). It is interesting
to note that the contours for all three factor prices are positively sloped.
This is due to the fact that the two types of capital movement have opposite
e¤ects on each factor price. Points on the left- (right-)hand of a contour for
° represents lower (higher) values of °: Similarly, points on the left- (right-)
hand of a contour for w represents higher (lower) values of w: From Lemma
1, we have
Lemma 3: At the initial equilibrium point, Sr = Sw = S°:
Because of Lemma 3, schedule ff in Figure 2 can be used to represent
all three factor price schedules passing through the initial equilibrium point.
The lemma also con…rms Proposition 3 that because the new equilibrium
point must be on either the left-hand side or the right-hand side of the three
schedules, a small decrease in ¿ must change r and ° in the same direction
and w in the opposite direction. The following lemma helps determine how
the factor prices may change:
Lemma 4: (a) If condition (A) holds, then Sr = Sw = S° >S Á >S µ; or
(b) if condition (A) does not hold, then SÁ >S µ >S r = Sw = S°; where all
slopes are evaluated at the initial equilibrium point.
17Proof. From Lemma 2, we know that SÁ >S µ: We then consider the
di¤erence between Sr and SÁ:












rb¤ [(1 ¡ t¤)r¤
b¤ ¡ rb¤]
;
which is positive if condition (A) is satis…ed, noting that rb¤ < 0 and r¤
b¤ > 0:
We next compare S° with Sµ:




(1 ¡ ¿)°k ¡ °¤
k






°b¤[(1 ¡ ¿)°b¤ ¡ °¤
b¤]
;
which is positive if condition (A00) is violated, noting that °b¤ < 0 and °¤
b¤ > 0:
Note also that condition (A) is equivalent to (A00). Using Lemma 3, we have
Lemma 4.
Lemma 4 implies that in the small region close to the initial equilibrium
point, schedule ff for the three factor prices will not be in the region bounded
by schedules ÁÁ and µµ: Lemma 4 also con…rms Proposition 4, because, as
we showed earlier that after a small unilateral investment liberalization the
new equilibrium point, E0, must be higher than point E and on schedule ÁÁ:
4.3 Multilateral Investment Liberalization
We now turn to multilateral investment liberalization and determine its im-
pacts on factor prices. Suppose that home and foreign agree to lower their








¤ = ¾d¿<0; (32)
where ¾ ´ t¤=¿: The value of ¾ depends on the initial income taxes in the
two countries. In particular, ¾ ! 0 if t¤ ! 0,o r¾ !1if ¿ ! 0.S u b s t i t u t e













18The signs of the e¤ects of multilateral investment liberalization given in (33a)
and (33b) come from the properties of functions Á and µ derived earlier.
These two equations show that liberalization of direct investment by both
countries will encourage the movement of both types of capital. The mag-
nitudes of the e¤ects on the movement of each type of capital depends on,
among other things, the initial income tax ratio, ¾:
Proposition 6 Multilateral investment liberalization encourages the move-
ment of both types of capital.
Proposition 6 is not surprising. By Proposition 1, a unilateral investment
liberalization by the home country bene…ts the movement of both types of
capital. We expect that Proposition 1 can be applied to a unilateral in-
vestment liberalization by the foreign country, which means that unilateral
investment liberalization policies by the countries reinforce each other on the
movement of both types of capital. Thus if both countries agree to reduce
their restriction on investment from the other countries, movements of both
types of capital bene…t.
The changes in the movement of both types of capital can be illustrated
in Figure 3. From the derivatives of functions Á and µ; a small decrease in ¿
will shift schedule µµ upward while a small decrease in t¤ shifts schedule ÁÁ
to the right. The new equilibrium point, E0, must be in the region above the
initial equilibrium point E and bounded by schedules ÁÁ and µµ:
The last result is very useful, because we can use the results derived earlier
to determine the impacts of multilateral investment liberalization on income
distribution. Applying Lemma 4, we have
Proposition 7 A small multilateral investment liberalization will improve
the home rental rates of both types of capital and will lower the home wage
rate if and only if condition (A) is satis…ed.
Based on Proposition 7, we can conclude that multilateral investment
liberalization can win the unanimous support from all owners of di¤erent
factors, as long as factor owners care only about their factor service incomes.
195 Investment Liberalization with Monopoly
Power in Trade
So far, our analysis is limited to the cases in which commodity prices faced
by the countries are not a¤ected by the movement of capital. We found
that either unilateral or multilateral investment liberalization will bene…t
some factor owners but hurt some other factor owners. The next question is
whether by relaxing this assumption we can …nd a Pareto improving (for the
home country) multilateral investment liberalization.
We now determine how the world price ratio is determined endogenously.
To do that, we have to derive the features of the foreign country more explic-
itly. With given domestic price ratio p¤ and the amounts of the two types of
capital, ¹ K¤ + k and ¹ B¤ ¡ b¤, the foreign GDP function can be denoted by
g¤(p¤; ¹ K¤ + k; ¹ B¤ ¡ b¤); where the given labor endowment is not shown for
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Note that the sign of Y ¤
p¤ is ambiguous, because while the production e¤ect is
positive, an increase in p lowers the income of foreign capital working in the
home country but raises the payment to home capital working locally. The
foreign consumption demand can be denote by C¤
1(p¤;Y¤(p¤;k;b ¤;¿;t ¤)): De-
…ne m¤ ´ @C¤
1=@Y ¤; where m¤p¤ is the foreign propensity to consume good
1. Assuming that both goods are normal, 1 >m ¤p¤ > 0: The foreign ex-
port supply function of good 1 can now be de…ned as E¤(p¤;k;b ¤;¿;t ¤) ´
Q¤
1(p¤;k;b ¤)¡C¤
1(p¤;Y¤(p¤;k;b ¤;¿;t ¤)): The following derivatives of the for-











































The signs of E¤
p¤ and E¤
k are in general ambiguous. If the foreign o¤er curve
is positively sloped, then E¤
p¤ > 0: If the tax rate t¤ and the movements of
both types of capital are small, then E¤
k > 0:







where the equilibrium condition p = p¤ has been used. Assuming a unique
free-trade equilibrium, the equilibrium world relative price of good 1 can be




The partial derivatives of function p can be obtained by totally di¤erentiating





















where £ ´ Ep + E¤
p¤: To have a free-trade equilibrium stable in a Walrasian
sense, we assume that £ > 0: The general principle for a change in p is that
14Note that if the world capital markets and the world good-1 market are in equilibrium,
by the Walras Law, so is the world good-2 market.
21if a change in a variable such as k l e a d st oa ne x c e s ss u p p l yo fg o o d1a t
the initial price level, then p will drop. However, the signs of the derivatives
in (36a) to (36d) are generally ambiguous, because the numerators in these
expressions have ambiguous signs.
To simplify the following analysis, let us make one additional assumption:
Both countries have identical and homothetic preferences. Since under free
trade the two countries are facing the same relative commodity price, m =
m¤: Using the above analysis, E¿+E¤
¿ = Et¤+E¤
t¤ =0 ; which means that p¿ =
pt¤ =0 : This result is not surprising, because a change in either income tax,
¿ or t¤; is a redistribution of income between the countries. With identical
and homothetic preferences, and when facing the same commodity prices,
the decrease in the demand for good 1 by the country that faces a drop in
income is matched by an increase in the demand for the good by the same
amount by the other country. With production of the good independent of
income taxes, the equilibrium commodity price ratio remains unchanged. As
a result, condition (35) can be written as
p = p(k;b
¤): (37)
When the commodity price ratio is determined endogenously, the tech-
niques developed in previous sections for analyzing the e¤ects of investment
liberalization can be applied here although the analysis becomes more com-
plicated. First, the equilibrium of capital movement under free trade can
still be described by conditions (15a) and (15b), although both functions
now depend not only on the capital movement and income taxes, but also
on the relative price p: We can, however, substitute condition (37) into the











The derivatives of these two functions, which can be determined in the usual
way, are equal to:
~ Ák = Ák + Áppk
~ Áb¤ = Áb¤ + Áppb¤
~ µk = µk + µppk
~ µb¤ = µb¤ + µppb¤:
22The partial derivatives in general have ambiguous signs.
When given the policy parameters ¿ and t¤; functions ~ Á(k;b¤;t ¤) and
~ µ(k;b¤;¿) can be illustrated in Figure 4 by schedules ~ Á~ Á and ~ µ~ µ: The slopes
























Because the derivatives of the functions have ambiguous signs, the two sched-
ules may be positively or negatively sloped. If, however, the two functions
are not too sensitive to the commodity price ratio, then the derivatives are
approximately the same as the corresponding ones derived in earlier sections
with p kept constant. As a result, both schedules are positively sloped, the
case shown in Figure 4 and assumed in the rest of this paper. Again for a
stable equilibrium, we assume that schedule ~ Á~ Á is steeper than schedule ~ µ~ µ;
i.e., ~ SÁ > ~ Sµ:
If both countries liberalize investment from the other country, movement
of both types of capital will be encouraged. Graphically, schedule ~ Á~ Á shifts
to the right while schedule ~ µ~ µ shifts up. The new equilibrium point E0 is
above point E and is in the region bounded by schedules ~ Á~ Á and ~ µ~ µ:
To determine how multilateral investment liberalization may a¤ect in-
come distribution in the home country, let us de…ne the following reduced













These three reduced-form functions can be illustrated by contours in Figure 4
corresponding to di¤erent values of factor prices. For example, contour ~ w ~ w,
which passes through the initial equilibrium point E, represents di¤erent
levels of movements of the two types of capital that produce the initial wage
rate. Contours ~ r~ r and ~ °~ ° can be interpreted in the same way. The slopes of
23these contours are equal to





















In (39a) to (39c), the slopes of the three contours depend on, among other
things, the values of wp; rp; and °p: As a result, the three contours may
have di¤erent slopes at the initial equilibrium points and do not coincide.
Furthermore, condition (A) is not su¢cient to determine whether the three
contours are steeper or less steep than schedules ~ Á~ Á and ~ µ~ µ: In fact, it is
possible that the three factor price contour through E can be steeper than
schedule ~ µ~ µ while less steep than ~ Á~ Á; a case shown in Figure 4.
We now turn to the following question: Does there exist a Pareto improv-
ing multilateral investment liberalization for the home country? To answer
this question, let us refer to the case shown in Figure 4. In the case shown,
the three contours for the factor prices divide the region above point E and
bounded by schedules ~ Á~ Á and ~ µ~ µ into four subregions, which are labeled A,
B, C, and D. In the presence of multilateral investment liberalization equi-
librium, the new equilibrium point can be in each of these subregions, and
being in a di¤erent subregion will have di¤erent impacts on the factor prices.
Based on the analysis above, the impacts on the factor prices depending on
where the new equilibrium point are described by the following table:
¢r ¢° ¢w
A ¡¡+
B + ¡ +
C +++
D ++¡
where a minus (plus) sign means that the variable decreases (increases) if
the new equilibrium point shifts to that region as a result of investment
liberalization by both countries.
The above table shows that in the case considered, at least some factor
owners are better o¤. Therefore the investment liberalization agreement will
24receive at least some support. The interesting case is one in which the equi-
librium point shifts to subregion C, making all factor owners better o¤. This
means that the home government can expect to get support from all factor
owners, as long as they care only about how their income from factor services
may change. Since it was shown that unilateral investment liberalization by
either country shifts the equilibrium point up and along either schedule ~ Á~ Á
or ~ µ~ µ; Figure 4 further implies that in the present case liberalizing direct
investment by either country will not yield Pareto improvement to the home
country.
6C o n c l u d i n g R e m a r k s
As the WTO is paying more attention to trade related investment issues,
it is expected that future trade talks will include liberalizing investment
among countries. This paper examines how multilateral investment may
a¤ect income distribution and commodity trade.
We construct a model with sector-speci…c capital for the objective of this
paper. This model has the advantage of allowing a general-equilibrium anal-
ysis of two-way capital movement and multilateral investment liberalization,
and is used to capture the fact that international investment is embodied
with sector-speci…c technology.
Our analysis shows that if investment liberalization has little e¤ect on
commodity prices in the world, then some factor owners in the home country
will gain but some other factor owners will lose, whether the home country
liberalizes investment unilaterally or both countries liberalize investment. If
commodity prices are a¤ected by capital movement, then it is possible that
all factor owners in the home country gain from a multilateral investment
liberalization.
The present analysis focuses mainly on income distribution in the ab-
sence of lumpsum compensation. One reason is that lumpsum compensation
to fully compensate the loss of certain groups of people due to a trade pol-
icy is not common. An interesting extension of the present analysis is to
see whether Pareto improving lumpsum compensation is available to a small
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